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A SENSE OF PURPOSE: THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
GEORGE P. VARGHESE
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety."'
"The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal
vigilance .... "2
In the fall of 2002, the United States government gained a blunt
new weapon in its ongoing War on Terror at the expense of the
Fourth Amendment and the rights of U.S. citizens. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) met for the first
time in its twenty-four year history to hear the government's appeal of
an en banc lower court's unanimous interpretation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 3 as amended by
provisions of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 20014 (commonly referred to as "Patriot
t A.B. 1997, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Pennsylva-
nia. I am grateful for all the help I received on earlier drafts of this Comment. Many
thanks to my editors, Ilana Eisenstein and Laura Forman, for their insightful com-
ments, stellar editing skills, and overall patience in guiding this Comment to coher-
ence. Thanks are also due to the Associate Editors of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review assigned to this piece. I also owe a good deal of gratitude to Professor
Catherine T. Strve for her helpful suggestions. And finally, thanks to my family and
friends who continuously support me, not only in this endeavor but in all aspects of my
life, beyond what I truly deserve. As is true in life, is true here, all errors are mine own.
I BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (London 1759), reprinted in 3 JARED SPARKS, THE
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2 John Philpot Curran, Address before the Lord Lieutenant and Privy Council of
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MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN IRELAND 4 (3d ed. 1811).
3 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2000).
4 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
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Act"). On November 18, 2002, FISCR issued its first opinion,5
overruling the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's (FISC) statu-
tory interpretation of FISA and upholding the constitutionality of the
Patriot Act's "significant purpose" test, a test which relaxes the barriers
between law enforcement and intelligence investigations.
As a result of this ruling, law enforcement investigators can now
bypass the ordinary Fourth Amendment and Title 1116 surveillance
requirements by invoking a foreign intelligence purpose as a pretext
for obtaining a FISA warrant to use in a criminal investigation. The
effect of this power is that U.S. citizens now face the threat of secret
law enforcement investigations based on FISA warrants issued without
any showing of probable cause of criminal activity.8 The warrants are
granted in ex parte, in camera proceedings that are subject neither to
discovery by the defendant nor meaningful suppression review by
district courts. This is an unconstitutional price that is too high to
pay, even in the name of post-September 11 national security.9
This Comment examines the FISCR opinion and calls into
question the constitutionality of the Patriot Act's "significant purpose"
test. Part I discusses the background of the foreign intelligence ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Part II
5 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1615 (2003).
6 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2000)) [hereinafter Title Ill].
7 While the case before the FISCR only dealt with electronic surveillance, the
ruling also would apply to physical searches conducted under FISA. FISA originally
permitted only electronic surveillance, but was amended in 1995 to include physical
searches. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829 (allowing the president to authorize physical
searches without a court order). The provisions covering physical searches under FISA
mirror those covering electronic surveillance. Thus, while this paper refers to elec-
tronic surveillance throughout, the same arguments are applicable to physical searches
under FISA.
8 Although FISA applies to surveillance of both U.S. and non-U.S. persons, this
article addresses the impact primarily on U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens.
9 Political leaders have begun to reach this conclusion as well. On July 31, 2003,
Senators Lisa Murkowski and Ron Wyden introduced a bill that would reinstate the
primary purpose test by amending the language of FISA to require foreign intelligence
to be "the primary purpose" of a FISA investigation, rather than "a significant purpose"
as required by the Patriot Act. S. 1552, 108th Cong. § 10 (2003). See also Murkowski
Introduces Bill to Change USA Patriot Act, WHITE HOUSE BULL., (Bull. News Network,
Vienna, Va.) Aug. 1, 2003, at 1 ("We must strike a careful and constitutional balance
between protecting the individual rights of Americans and giving our law enforcement
and intelligence officials the tools they need to prevent future terrorist attacks. To
date it appears portions of the Patriot Act may have moved the scales out of balance."




details the passage of FISA and the evolution of its interpretation by
the courts and the executive branch. Part III focuses on the Patriot
Act's amendments to FISA in light of the expanded needs to combat
terrorism, and both the government's argument and the FISCR
opinion upholding its constitutionality. Finally, Part 1V evaluates the
validity of these arguments in light of the history of the foreign
intelligence exception, Title III, and the "special governmental needs"
doctrine and concludes that the FISCR erred in its ruling.
I. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION AND THE FISA DOCTRINE
A. The Birth of a Constitutional and Statutory National Security Exception
The Fourth Amendment protects U.S. citizens from governmental
intrusion by providing that "[t] he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."" In the landmark case
Katz v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that electronic
surveillance constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, cannot be conducted by the government
without a showing of probable cause and a warrant issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate. 12 The Court reaffirmed its long-held view
that searches conducted without a warrant are "per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.",
3
In a footnote, however, the Court expressly passed on the issue of
whether the Fourth Amendment requires prior judicial authorization
14
of surveillance in cases involving national security. In his concur-
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12 Id. at 356-57.
13 Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).
14 Id. at 358 n.23; see also STEPHEN DYcuS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY IAw 614-15
(3d ed. 2002) (discussing the Katz footnote and the development of the national
security exception); William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National
Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court
explicitly declined to extend the Katz holding to cases involving national security and
the effect of this omission on the Title III statutory framework); Americo R.
Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 800 (1989) ("The
Court's gratuitous discussion in Katz regarding surveillance activities undertaken in
furtherance of national security interests was critical to the development of FISA.");
Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental
Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of "Intelligence" Investigations, 150 U.
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rence, Justice White more explicitly suggested that the Court "should
not require the warrant procedure if the President of the United
States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered
the requirements of national security and authorized electronic sur-
veillance as reasonable.' ' 1
Justice Douglas, however, in a separate concurrence joined by
Justice Brennan, adamantly rejected any notion of a national security
exception to the Fourth Amendment, believing it would give a "green
light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping
without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels
'national security' matters." 16 Justice Douglas noted that the president
and the attorney general are "properly interested parties, cast in the
role of adversary, in national security cases." 17 Furthermore, "spies
and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment as suspected gamblers."' Therefore, Justice Douglas
concluded, the Fourth Amendment rights of national security suspects
could not be assured "when the President and Attorney General
assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and
disinterested, neutral magistrate."19
Seeking to establish uniform procedures by which law enforce-
ment may conduct electronic surveillance in accordance with the Katz
ruling, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title 111). 20  Title III codifies the Katz
decision by requiring probable cause before the government may
conduct electronic surveillance-entailing both that the suspect may
commit, or has committed, a criminal offense, and that the targeted
facility is connected with that offense.2' Most significantly, Title III
permits authorization of a warrant only upon judicial determination
of probable cause and upon government compliance with a strict
PA. L. REV. 1651, 1658 (2002) (noting that the Court's "highly controversial foot-
note... left the door open for warrantless surveillance in circumstances concerning
national security").
15 389 U.S. at 364 (White,J., concurring).
16 Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17 Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18 Id. (DouglasJ, concurring).
19 Id. (DouglasJ, concurring).
20 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
2 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1).
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procedural regime designed both to protect the integrity of surveil-
lance evidence and to limit government intrusion on privacy.22
While Title III was meant to be the exclusive means by which
law enforcement could conduct electronic surveillance, Congress
specifically excluded from its reach executive officials conducting in-
vestigations dealing with national security matters. The statute stated
that:
[N]othing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts
of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
B. Keith and Limitations on the National Security Exception
Four years later, in United States v. United States District Court (Keith) ,24
the Supreme Court returned to the issue it left open in the Katz
footnote and clarified the Fourth Amendment's national security
exception. In Keith, the government sought to prosecute three
citizens who were conspiring to bomb an office of the Central
Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.25 In pretrial proceed-
ings, the defendants moved to compel the government to disclose
electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant to determine
22 See id. § 2518 (setting forth the procedural requirements and probable cause
standard for judicial authorization of electronic surveillance).
23 Id. § 2511(3) (repealed 1978). This section was repealed in 1978 following the
passage of FISA.
24 407 U.S. 297 (1972); see also Banks & Bowman, supra note 14, at 49-53
(summarizing the Keith decision and the Supreme Court's differentiation of the
president's power under the national security exception in situations involving
domestic organizations); Cinquegrana, supra note 14, at 803 (noting that while Keith
"rejected the government's arguments that courts lacked the necessary expertise and
security to evaluate this type of intelligence activity, it emphasized that its holding did
not extend to surveillance involving foreign powers or their agents"); Rackow, supra
note 14, at 1662 ("Although the Court acknowledged the Executive's intelligence-
gathering authority, it held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless
wiretaps in cases involving domestic threats to national security.").
25 407 U.S. at 299.
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whether it had tainted any potential trial evidence. 26 The Attorney
General admitted to the surveillance but argued that it was for
intelligence-gathering purposes and therefore fell under the national
security exception to the Fourth Amendment, as codified in § 2511(3)
of Title III, and did not need not be disclosed to the defendants 7
The government claimed the defendant's actions posed a "'clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
' '
21
The district court disagreed, finding the surveillance to be a violation
of the Fourth Amendment and ordered disclosure.29 In affirming the
lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court held that the language in
§ 2511(3) of Title III neither limited nor augmented presidential
power, but rather that "Congress simply left presidential powers where
it found them., 30 Therefore, the issue was whether the president had
inherent constitutional authority to order warrantless surveillance of
domestic organizations for national security purposes as an exception
to the Fourth Amendment.
31
In answering this question, the Supreme Court recognized that
national security investigations could implicate both First and Fourth
Amendment interests to an even greater degree than cases involving
ordinary crime. While the Constitution charges the president with
the obligation to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States, '33 national security investigations also involve
"greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech."34 As a result,
Justice Powell concluded that the Court must balance "the duty of
Government to protect the domestic security, [with] the potential
danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and
free expression. The Court described this danger as:
[T]he tendency of Government-however benevolent and benign its
motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary
when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is
26 Id. at 299-300.
27 Id. at 301.
28 Id. at 302 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)).
29 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
30 407 U.S. at 303.
31 Id. at 299.
32 Id. at 313.
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
34 407 U.S. at 313.
35 Id. at 314-15.
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acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept
as the power to protect "domestic security." Given the difficulty of
defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to
protect that interest becomes apparent.36
The Court thus adopted Justice Douglas' reasoning in his Katz
concurrence and held that the Fourth Amendment does not distin-
guish between various substantive offenses and that its "freedoms can-
not properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch." :7
Because the potential for abuse was so great and the rights protected
were so fundamental, the Court held that, in intelligence-gathering
investigations involving domestic organizations, the Fourth Amend-
ment required the executive branch to have probable cause of crimi-
nal wrongdoing and to seekjudicial authorization prior to conducting
electronic surveillance. 8
While the Keith ruling would seem to be definitive, it did not
entirely resolve the issue of warrantless national security surveillance
in the United States. The Keith case involved purely domestic organi-
zations where there was "no evidence of any involvement, directly or
indirectly, of a foreign power.''9 Specifically, the Court stated that its
opinion did not pass 'judgment on the scope of the President's
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers,
within or without this country., 40 Therefore, circuit courts continu-
ously have held that Keith merely narrowed the larger national-
security exception to a more limited foreign intelligence exception to
the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Circuit Courts Define the Foreign Intelligence Exception
Following Keith, five federal circuit courts of appeals reviewed
cases involving the president's constitutional power to conduct
41warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.
36 Id. at 314.
37 Id. at 316-17; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1960) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (opining that there is "no distinction under the Fourth Amendment
between types of crimes").
38 Id. at 321.
39 Id. at 309.
40 Id. at 308.
41 See DYcuS ET AL., supra note 14, at 626-27 (discussing the post-Keith circuit court
cases involving warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance); Banks & Bowman, supra
note 14, at 56-57 (explaining that the proper balance between the First and Fourth
20031
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Four of the five courts of appeals addressing this issue upheld the
Executive Branch's arguments supporting the constitutionality of a
foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. The circuit courts found constitutional authority for the
exception based on the president's inherent power as commander in
chiefV2 and his role as the "sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations.,
43
In 1973, one year after Keith was decided, the Fifth Circuit
addressed the same issue in United States v. Brown.44 In Brown, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the legality of warrantless surveillance when initiated
for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence.45 Although the
defendant in Brown was not the target of the investigation, the
government did intercept several of his conversations during its
46surveillance. At the defendant's subsequent criminal trial, the court
refused to compel disclosure of the evidence, stating only that it was
not in the national interest and that the surveillance was made "in
connection with obtaining foreign intelligence information. '47  In
upholding a foreign intelligence exception, the appellate court stated
that, "because of the President's constitutional duty to act for the
United States in the field of foreign relations, and his inherent power
to protect national security in the context of foreign affairs[,]... the
President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. 48  In distinguishing the
facts of the case from Keith, the appellate court stated that
"[r]estrictions upon the President's power which are appropriate in
cases of domestic security become artificial in the context of the
Amendment rights of individuals and the government's interest in protecting national
security is resolved by the FBI's "fact-sensitive inquiries, without clear judicial criteria
for deciding when prior judicial warrant is required"); Cinquegrana, supra note 14, at
804 (suggesting that courts recognizing the foreign intelligence exception did so out
of "concern for the efficiency and expertise of the nation's foreign intelligence process
and the deleterious effects that might result from judicial interference"); Rackow,
supra note 14, at 1665 (describing the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that other
courts addressing the issue had "simply converted the Executive's need to gather
intelligence information into an absolute right to conduct warrantless surveillance
-- without giving sufficient thought to First and Fourth Amendment interests that may
be infringed upon by allowing the Executive to bypass judicial scrutiny").
42 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
43 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-22 (1936).
44 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
45 Id. at 426.
46 Id. at 424-25.
47 Id. at 427.
48 Id.
[Vol. 152: 385
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR IVEILLANCE
international sphere.' 49 In his concurrence, Judge Goldberg agreed
with the majority's reasoning, but cautioned that it was the "essential
burden of the courts to be ever vigilant, so that foreign intelligence
never becomes a proforma justification for any degree of intrusion into
zones of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."'0
The following year, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed
the same issue in United States v. Butenko,"' which involved the elec-
tronic surveillance of a Soviet national working with an American
citizen to obtain sensitive information regarding United States foreign
policy and military capabilities.5' As in Brown, the Third Circuit found
that the president's constitutional authority to conduct foreign
intelligence investigations was "implied from his duty to conduct the
nation's foreign affairs., 53 However, the court qualified this statement
by adding that, although national security threats are of immeasurable
gravity, there is "nothing in the language of the Constitution tojustify
completely removing the Fourth Amendment's requirements in the
foreign affairs field."54 Thus, the court determined that, while prior
judicial authorization would interfere too much with the executive's
foreign affairs power, post-search judicial review represented an
important safeguard of Fourth Amendment rights and a deterrent to
potential abuse.Y Further, the Third Circuit held that the district
court, "when reviewing a particular search must, above all, be assured
that [securing foreign intelligence information] was in fact its primary
purpose and that the accumulation of evidence of criminal activity was
incidental." 56
In United States v. Truong Dinh Hung,5 7 the Fourth Circuit faced for
the first time the constitutional issue of whether or not the
government can use information collected from warrantless foreign
49 Id. While ultimately limiting its holding to domestic security concerns, Keith
explicitly recognizes a distinction between domestic and foreign national security and
surveillance. 407 U.S. at 308, 321-22.
50 Brown, 484 F.2d at 427 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
51 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
52 Id. at 596.
53 Id. at 603.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 605-06.
5r Id. at 606 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875
(9th Cir. 1977) (upholding the foreign intelligence exception (citing Butenko, 494 F.2d
at 605-06)).
57 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Truong]. Though the case was
decided in 1980, it involved surveillance which was conducted in 1977-1978, prior to
the enactment of FISA. Id. at 912. FISA, therefore, was not yet applicable.
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intelligence surveillance in a criminal prosecution.58 David Truong, a
Vietnamese national, conspired with Ronald Humphrey, a U.S. citizen
and employee of the United States Information Agency, to pass on
classified information dealing with U.S. policy in Southeast Asia to the
North Vietnamese during the 1977 Paris peace negotiations.5
Unbeknownst to Truong, the courier he used to transport the
confidential information to the North Vietnamese in Paris was an
informant employed by the Foreign Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)."° For more than a year, the
agencies conducted intense surveillance of Truong in order to locate
the source of the information leak."' Though the surveillance was
authorized by the Attorney General, it was conducted without a
62warrant or prior judicial approval. At trial, the defendants argued
that the foreign intelligence exception should apply only when the
surveillance is conducted solely for foreign intelligence purposes, and
therefore, all evidence obtained without a warrant should be
suppressed.63 The government countered that the foreign intelligence
exception should apply when surveillance is conducted for any
foreign intelligence reason, and therefore, the fruits of that
64surveillance should be admitted at trial.
Rejecting both parties' arguments, the Fourth Circuit noted that
"almost all foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal
investigations,"6 5 and therefore neither party's approach is acceptable.
Thus, the court ruled that the foreign intelligence exception applies
"only when the surveillance is conducted 'primarily' for foreign
intelligence reasons. 6 6 The court held that this restriction on the
foreign intelligence exception was necessary
because[,] once surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation,
the courts are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination, and because, importantly, individual privacy interests
come to the fore and government foreign policy concerns recede when
58 Id. at 912-13.
59 Id. at 911-12.
60 Id. at 912.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 915.
64 Id.
65 Id.
W Id. (emphasis added).
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the government is primarily attempting to form the basis for a criminal. 67
prosecution.
The court affirmed the district court determination that, when the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department took over a central role in
the investigation from counterintelligence officials, its focus became
primarily criminal in nature. 6 s As a result, all evidence obtained by the
government through warrantless surveillance after that point was
suppressed.69
While the circuit courts in each of the cases above upheld the
lawfulness of a foreign intelligence exception, in Zweibon v. Mitchell,70
the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, refused to follow suit. In Zweibon,
members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), who were the subjects
of warrantless electronic surveillance, brought a Bivens action71 against
the Attorney General for violation of their Fourth Amendment
rights. 72  The JDL was a domestic organization, whose focus "was
primarily directed at opposing the Soviet government's restrictive
emigration policies. 73 The government argued that, by perpetrating
violent acts against Soviet officials and installations in the United
States, the JDL was causing international embarrassment, interfering
with peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and risking possible Soviet retaliation against American
citizens in Moscow. 74 For these reasons, warrantless surveillance of theS 7 5
group was proper under the foreign intelligence exception. The
D.C. Circuit rejected the government's argument, reaffirming Keith:
A warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed on a domestic
organization that is neither the agent of nor acting in collaboration with
a foreign power, even if the surveillance is installed under presidential
directive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection of
the national security.6
67 Id.
68 Id. at 916.
69 Id.
70 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
71 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (finding
that a plaintiff has a private right of action under the Fourth Amendment to bring suit
to recover damages if her rights protected by that amendment have been violated by
federal officials).
72 516 F.2d at 605.
73 Id. at 608.
74 Id. at 607-09.
75 Id. at 608.
76 Id. at 614.
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In dicta, a plurality of the court went even further, concluding that
"absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveillance is
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.",
7
1
By the end of the 1970s, the national security exception to the
Fourth Amendment, first identified in Katz, was refined to a foreign
intelligence exception limited to investigations against foreign powers
and agents of foreign powers. Four out of the five circuit courts that
had addressed the issue upheld this more limited foreign intelligence
exception as constitutional under both the president's powers as
commander in chief and his sole responsibility for the foreign affairs
of the nation. Furthermore, the circuit courts limited the exception
to instances where the primary purpose of the investigation was foreign
intelligence. Provided that surveillance fell within the foreign
intelligence exception, Truong then permitted the fruits of such an
investigation to be used against defendants during a criminal trial.71
Despite the importance of the issues at stake and the split among the
circuits, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of foreign
intelligence beyond its indirect statements in Katz and Keith.79 By
1978, however, Congress entered the debate.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FISA DOCTRINE
A. Historical Background to EISA
During the 1970s, Congress took a closer look at the Executive
Branch's use of warrantless surveillance following revelations of high-
profile abuses of power such as the Watergate break-in 8 and the White
House "enemies" list.8' In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the
"Church Committee") issued a report cataloging a litany of occasions
when intelligence activities had "exceeded the restraints on the
exercise of governmental power which are imposed by our country's
77 Id.
78 629 F.2d at 916.
79 See supra Part l.A-B (discussing the evolution of the national security
exception).
See Cinquegrana, supra note 14, at 806 (discussing the antagonistic mood in
Congress following the Watergate scandal).
See Anita Bernstein, Note, Executive Targeting of Congressmen as a Violation of the
Arrest Clause, 94 YALE LJ. 647, 649 n.10 (1985) (listing politicians whose names
appeared on President Nixon's White House enemies list used as a reference by the
administration to identify and harass his political enemies).
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Constitution, laws and traditions."8" The report revealed widespread
and flagrant abuse of power by FBI and CIA officials against U.S.
citizens who participated in domestic political organizations including
the Women's Liberation Movement, Students for a Democratic
Society, Black Student Unions, the NAACP, and the anti-war
movement.1
s
These national security investigations were conducted "against
United States citizens who were not readily identifiable as reasonable
sources of foreign intelligence information, who appeared to pose
little threat to the national security, and who were not alleged to be
involved in any criminal activity." 4 Between 1960 and 1974, there
were more than 500,000 separate FBI counterintelligence
investigations of persons or groups under suspicion of being
subversives, yet not a single person or group was ever prosecuted
during this period s5 However, during these investigations, the FBI
undertook steps to discredit individuals, manipulate the media's
perception of the groups, distort data to influence government policy,
and generally chill the individuals' First Amendment rights to free
speech and association. s6 In addition to legal violations, the report
detailed examples of FBI "transgressions against human decency"
including:
the smear campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the testing of
dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens, the dissemination
of information about the sex lives, drinking habits, and marital problems
of electronic surveillance targets, and the COINTELPRO attempts to
turn dissident organizations against one another and to destroy
marriages. 7
82 S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. II, at 2 (1976); see Cinquegrana, supra note 14, at 806
(noting that the Church Committee "uncovered far-ranging infringements upon
individual privacy interests," especially through the use of warrantless electronic
surveillance).
83 S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. II, at 7-9 (1976).
84 Cinquegrana, supra note 14, at 807.
85 S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. II, at 19 (1976).
86 Id. at 9, 139.
87 Id. at 140; see also Steven W. Becker, Maintaining Secret Government Dossiers on the
First Amendment Activities of American Citizens: The Law Enforcement Activity Exception to the
Privacy Act, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 681 (noting that Senator Gaylor Nelson had
referred to the FBI's COINTELPRO operation as a clandestine program in which the
FBI conducted undercover surveillance). COINTELPRO, the FBI's acronym for
counterintelligence program, was a series of covert actions taken by the FBI over a
fifteen-year period to "disrupt" and "neutralize" domestic groups and individuals.
S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III, at 3-4 (1976). The FBI's tactics used in COINTELPRO were
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The report noted that the intelligence community's "general attitude
was that intelligence needs were responsive to a higher law. . . the
greater good, the national security." '
In response to these widespread and flagrant violations, the
Church Committee stated unequivocally in its conclusions and recom-
mendations its belief regarding activities such as warrantless surveil-
lance or searches that "[t]here is no inherent constitutional authority
for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the law." 9 The
Committee strongly recommended that Congress create a statutory
framework to regulate the use of electronic surveillance for intelli-
gence purposes within the United States by amending Title III to
require warrants for all electronic surveillance. 90 The Church Com-
mittee concluded that only by requiring a judicial warrant, and
removing counterintelligence electronic surveillance from the un-
checked discretion of the executive, could the flagrant abuses of power
be eliminated.91
B. Passage of FISA
In 1978, Congress acted upon the Church Committee's
recommendation and passed FISA as the exclusive means by which
the executive branch may conduct electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes within the United States.92 Specifically, FISA
limits electronic surveillance to investigations of a foreign power or
agents of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign
intelligence information.9 3 Congress included within the definition of
a "foreign power," not only a foreign government, but also "a group
the same as those used against hostile foreign agents-"clandestine activities intended
to influence political choices and social values." Id. at 4. COINTELPRO was the result
of pressure on the FBI to do something about a perceived threat that law enforcement
techniques could not address because of the Supreme Court's imposition of const-
itutional restrictions. Id. at 10-11. There were five recognized threats to domestic
security that COINTELPRO programs targeted: the Communist Party USA program,
the Socialist Workers Party program, the White Hate Group program, the Black
Nationalist Hate Group program, and the New Left program. Id. at 4.
S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III, at 145 (1976).
89 Id. at 297.
90 Id. at 327-28.
1 See id. at 325, 327 (noting that with a warrant requirement "the dangerous
doctrine of inherent Executive power to target an American for electronic surveillance
can be put to rest at last.").




engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor. ', 4 The term "international terrorism" is defined as activities
that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or any State;
(2) appear to be intended-
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in
'9which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. 95
The Act authorizes electronic surveillance as long as the
government can demonstrate that the target is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power (defined as a non-United States person
acting within the United States for or on behalf of a foreign power)
engaged in clandestine intelligence activities within the country
contrary to United States interests.96 Congress created a heightened
threshold for intelligence investigations of U.S. persons (defined as
citizens or permanent residents) 97 by requiring that they "knowingly
engage" in the proscribed activity before permitting surveillance.9
Thus, a U.S. citizen can be found to be an agent of a foreign power if
she (a) "knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence" activities,
which may violate U.S. criminal laws on behalf of a foreign power; (b)
"knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or
activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign
power"; or (c) "knowingly aids or abets any person" conducting such
activities. 99  Surveillance is permitted solely for the purpose of
obtaining "foreign intelligence information," which is "information
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect against" (a) actual or
94 § 1801(a).
95 § 1801 (c).
96 § 1801(b).
97 § 1801(i).
98 § 1801(b) (2) (emphasis added).
99 -
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potential attack by a foreign power; (b) sabotage or international
terrorism; or (c) clandestine intelligence activities by a foreign power
or its agent.10 Foreign intelligence information can also be "infor-
mation with respect to a foreign power... that relates to, and if
concerning a United States person is necessary to (a) the national
defense or the security of the United States; or (b) the conduct of the
foreign affairs of the United States." 1 1
Pursuant to its Article III power,10 2 Congress established the FISC,
comprised of seven district court judges appointed by the Chief
Justice.0 3 The FISC has jurisdiction to consider applications and grant
orders for electronic surveillance targeting a foreign power or agent
of a foreign power to obtain foreign intelligence information within
the United States.' ° The Act establishes a procedure by which a
federal officer must submit an application for an order approving
electronic surveillance, including a certification "that the purpose of the
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information."'0'5
The FISCjudge reviews the application for electronic surveillance
in an ex parte, secret proceeding. 0 6 Under FISA, a FISC judge must
issue an order authorizing the electronic surveillance if, based on the
facts established in the application, there is probable cause to believe
that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and
that she is using, or about to use, the facilities targeted by the
surveillance. °7 Thus, unlike Title III, FISA grants little discretion to
the FISCjudges in approving a surveillance request. °s
100 § 1801 (e).
101 Id.
102 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.").
103 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000). The Patriot Act later amended this section by
expanding the number of FISCjudges from seven to eleven. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 208, 115 Stat. 291 (2001).
104 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a).
105 Id. § 1804(a) (7) (B) (emphasis added).
106 Id. § 1805.
107 § 1805(a) (1)-(3).
108 Title III provides that a judge may enter an ex parte order authorizing
surveillance if there is probable cause for belief that (a) "an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense;" (b) particular
communications concerning the offense will be intercepted; (c) normal investigative
techniques have tried and failed or will not be effective, and (d) the facilities targeted
are used, or are about to be used, in commission of such an offense. 18 U.S.C. §
2518(3) (2000). Clearly,judges reviewing the Title III applications have far greater
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In its report on the bill, the House specifically stated that "when
reviewing the certifications... unless there is a prima facie showing of
a fraudulent statement by a certifying officer, procedural regularity is the
only determination to be made if a non-U.S. person is the target."'0 1 ' If
the target is a U.S. person, a FISC judge has the additional minimal
responsibility of ensuring the certification is not "clearly erroneous.,,1
C. The Use of FISA Information for Law Enforcement Purposes
FISA provides for electronic surveillance solely in foreign
intelligence investigations and requires that the attorney general
adopt procedures to minimize the dissemination of information
gathered during an investigation against a U.S. person."' Despite
these limitations, FISA nevertheless allows the fruits of electronic
surveillance to be used in a subsequent criminal trial in certain
circumstances.
Specifically, FISA establishes that information gathered during a
foreign intelligence investigation may be used for law enforcement
purposes if authorized by the attorney general,"2 and notice is given
to the defendant. 13 A defendant may move to suppress the evidence
only on the grounds that the information was unlawfully acquired, or
that the information was collected during surveillance that exceeded
the authority granted in the FISA warrant.14
Once a defendant files a motion to discover, obtain, or suppress
FISA evidence, however, the attorney general may file an affidavit
claiming that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm national
security."5 At that point, the district court must review the applica-
tion, surveillance order, and other evidence in camera and ex parte to
determine the legality of the surveillance.1 6  If the district court
discretion in determining whether to approve a surveillance order than a FISCjudge
who must approve the order if the procedural requirements have been satisfied.
109 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 92-93 (1978) (emphasis added).
110 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (5) (2000).
III See id. § 1801 (h) (stating that the attorney general shall adopt procedures "to
minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpubli-
cly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent
with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelli-
gence information").
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determines that the surveillance was not lawfully authorized, the
evidence obtained or derived from the unlawful investigation must be
suppressed."' The practical effect of these provisions is that a
defendant, even if she is a U.S. citizen, may be prosecuted with
evidence collected by electronic surveillance, approved solely on the
basis of procedural regularity and documents required by statute,
without a showing of probable cause of any criminal wrongdoing, and
to which she may never obtain access to at trial-all for the sake of
national security.
While Title III was passed by Congress to implement the Court's
ruling in Katz and strictly apply the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement to electronic surveillance in law enforcement investiga-
tions, FISA was an attempt by Congress to regulate an area about
which the Court had remained silent-the executive branch's power
to conduct surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes."'
Therefore, FISA operates as a procedural framework within the
limited foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment
previously recognized by the courts of appeals. n 9 However, Congress
did adopt procedural safeguards "necessary to insure that electronic
surveillance by the U.S. Government within this country conforms to
the fundamental principles of the fourth amendment [sic] .,,120
While the FISA text does circumscribe surveillance powers, the
legislative history indicates that FISA was not intended to satisfy the
traditional Fourth Amendment procedures required in law enforce-
ment investigations. In its report on the bill, the House stated that
FISA surveillances "are not primarily for the purpose of gathering
evidence of a crime. They are to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion, which when it concerns United States persons must be necessary
to important national concerns. 12' The courts reaffirmed this by
117 § 1806(g).
118 See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Congress passed
FISA to settle what it believed to be the unresolved question of the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes, and to 'remove any doubt as to the lawfulness of such
surveillance."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt.1, at 25 (1978))).
119 See supra Part I.C (reviewing the circuit courts' recognition of a foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment).
120 S. REP. No. 95-701, at 13 (1978).
121 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 36 (1978).
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interpreting FISA in light of the preexisting foreign intelligence
exception jurisprudence set forth in cases like Butenko and Truong.1
2 2
For example, in United States v. Megahey,'23 the government sought
to prosecute four defendants, including one U.S. citizen, for
conspiring to smuggle firearms and explosives to the Provisional Irish
Republican Army for terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. 2 4 The
Attorney General authorized use of foreign intelligence informationS 125
collected during a FISA surveillance against the defendants at trial.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence as a violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights, claiming the surveillance was conducted
solely for law enforcement purposes.1 6 After recounting the evolution
of the foreign intelligence exception from Keith to Truong, the district
court upheld the constitutionality of FISA, ruling that the FISA
procedural safeguards implicitly satisfy the Truong primary purpose
test.17 Turning to the facts of the investigation, the district court
determined that since the statutory scope of FISA overlies the
constitutional scope of Truong, a valid investigation under one must
similarly be valid under the other. The district court recognized
that Congress anticipated the possibility of criminal prosecution
through FISA-obtained evidence, but noted that "surveillance under
FISA is appropriate only if foreign intelligence surveillance is the
Government's primary purpose.' 2 9  The primary purpose of the
investigation was to collect information on the international terrorist
group and thus the FISA evidence was usable at trial. 30
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Duggan,3 1 held
"[t]he requirement that foreign intelligence information be the
primary objective of the surveillance is plain not only from the language
122 See DYcUS ET AL., supra note 14, at 688 ("Courts have followed Truong and have
allowed evidence gathered during FISA surveillance to support a criminal conviction
after finding that intelligence was the 'primary' purpose of the surveillance .... ")
(citation omitted); Banks & Bowman, supra note 14, at 84 ("In each such challenge [by
criminal defendants] to date, the lower federal courts have sustained the FISA-based
surveillance under the 'primary purpose' test of the Truong decision.").
123 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affid sub nom United States v. Duggan, 743
F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
124 Id. at 1182.
125 Id. at 1183.
126 Id. at 1185-86.
127 Id. at 1189.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1189-90.
130 Id. at 1190.
131 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
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of § 1802(b) but also from the requirements in § 1804 as to what the
application must contain.' ' 2 The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court ruling that "the purpose of the surveillance... was to secure
foreign intelligence information and was not.., directed towards,, 133
criminal investigation or the institution of a criminal prosecution.
Following Duggan, circuit courts continued to follow the primary
purpose test in evaluating FISA surveillances. For example, in 1991,
the First Circuit, in United States v. Johnson,"'5 found that the primary
purpose test was necessary to ensure that FISA was "not to be used as
an end-run around the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
warrantless searches.' 36 However, if the FISA surveillance was proper,
the court reaffirmed that the fruits of the foreign intelligence
surveillance may be used in a subsequent criminal trial.'37 The First
Circuit stated that "[a]lthough evidence obtained under FISA
subsequently may be used in criminal prosecutions, the investigation
of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of the
surveillance. "1 3 Applying this rule, the court found that the primary
purpose of the investigation was foreign intelligence and, thus, upheld
the use of the FISA evidence at trial.
139
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit refused to decide the issue of
whether a FISA investigation required foreign intelligence to be the
"primary purpose" or simply "the purpose" (potentially one of several)
132 Id. at 77 (emphasis added). FISA states that FISC may grant an order approv-
ing electronic surveillance "for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence infor-
mation." 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000). Similarly, a FISA application requires
certification "that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information." Id. § 1804(a) (7) (B). Neither of these two sections cited by the Second
Circuit plainly states a primary purpose test. Thus, though it does not explicitly apply
Truong to FISA, the Second Circuit in Duggan, by affirming the primary purpose test
applied by the district court, read into FISA the heightened foreign intelligence
exception standard of Truong.
Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78 (quoting Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1190).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987) ("We agree
with the district court that the 'primary purpose of the surveillance, both initially and
throughout, was to gather foreign intelligence information."') (citation omitted);
United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
investigation "did not have as its purpose the primary objective of investigating a
criminal act").
135 952 F.2d 565 (lst Cir. 1991).
136 Id. at 572.
137Id. at 572.
'S Id. (citing Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77 and Truong, 629 F.2d at 915).
139 Johnson, 952 F.2d at 571-72.
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as the law explicitly stated. 40 The Ninth Circuit wrote, "We refuse to
draw too fine a distinction between criminal and intelligence
investigations. 'International terrorism,' by definition, requires the
investigation of activities that constitute crimes. That the government
may later choose to prosecute is irrelevant. FISA contemplates
prosecution based on evidence gathered through surveillance.... "'
"FISA is meant to take into account 'the differences between ordinary
criminal investigations to gather evidence of specific crimes and
foreign counterintelligence investigations to uncover and monitor
clandestine activities." 
42
The court did not decide the constitutional issue of whether
evidence collected during a FISA search, conducted for simply "the
purpose" of gathering foreign intelligence information, would be
admissible under the Fourth Amendment. Put another way, the
Ninth Circuit passed on the question of whether Truong is the
constitutional standard in a criminal prosecution. Before the circuit
courts could reach consensus on the question, the Attorney General
stepped into the debate.
D. The 1995 Attorney General Procedures
In 1995, Attorney General Janet Reno adopted comprehensive
procedures governing the interaction between law enforcement and
foreign intelligence investigations.4" The 1995 Procedures effectively
ended the legal debate by explicitly adopting the primary purpose test
and the operational distinctions set forth in Truong.4 4 Following the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning, the 1995 Procedures erected a wall with
the Criminal Division on one side and the FBI and the Office of
140 See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Regardless of
whether the test is one of purpose or primary purpose, our review of the government's
FISA materials convinces us that it is met in this case.").
14 Id. at 965 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1) (2000)).
142 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-701, at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3973, 3983).
143 See Memorandum fromJanet Reno, Attorney General, to the Assistant Attorney
General of the Criminal Division, Director of the FBI, Counsel for Intelligence Policy,
and United States Attorneys (July 19, 1995) [hereinafter The 1995 Procedures]
(outlining "Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division
Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations"),
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html.144
See 629 F.2d at 916 ("[E]ven these actors receive the protection of the warrant
requirement if the government is primarily attempting to put together a criminal
prosecution."); see also supra text accompanying notes 57-69 (discussing the Troung
decision).
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Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) (the government lawyers who
stand before the FISC) on the other. 145 The rationale behind the
separation was to protect the integrity of FISA investigations by
ensuring that they remained primarily for intelligence purposes.146
The 1995 Procedures provided that the FBI and OIPR inform the
Criminal Division when an investigation reasonably indicated "that a
significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed."
147
The FBI and OIPR were required to give the Criminal Division the
facts and circumstances supporting their belief that criminal activity
was involved. 148 If the Criminal Division believed law enforcement
interests were implicated, it could give "guidance to the FBI aimed at
preserving the option of a criminal prosecution., 149 The 1995 Proce-
dures explicitly stated that:
The Criminal Division shall not, however, instruct the FBI on the
operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA electronic surveillance or
physical searches. Additionally, the FBI and Criminal Division should
ensure that advice intended to preserve the option of a criminal
prosecution does not inadvertently result in either the fact or the appearance of
the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the [foreign intelligence] or
[foreign counterintelligence] investigation toward law enforcement objectives.
To verify the separation throughout a FISA investigation in which
the Criminal Division was participating, the FBI was directed to
maintain a log of all contacts between the two divisions, ' 1 and the
OIPR was required to keep the FISC apprised of the nature of the




Following the adoption of the 1995 Procedures, it would seem the
debate over the constitutionality of the foreign intelligence exception
145 See The 1995 Procedures, supra note 143, A(1) (regulating contacts between
the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, the FBI, and the OIPR during foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence investigations). The Truong court affirmed that
the purpose of an investigation can be determined by which division within the Justice
Department was playing the lead role. 629 F.2d at 913-16. Thus, when the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department took over a central role in the investigation, its
focus became primarily criminal in nature. Id. at 916.
146 See The 1995 Procedures, supra note 143 ("The purpose of these procedures is
to ensure that [foreign intelligence] and [foreign counterintelligence] investigations
are conducted lawfully.").
147 Id. § A(1).
148 Id.
149 Id. § A(6).
150 Id. (emphasis added).
151 Id. § A(4).
152 Id. § A(7).
[Vol. 152: 385
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
was finally resolved. By implementing the primary purpose doctrine,
the Justice Department clearly defined the constitutionally murky
boundaries between intelligence and law enforcement. However,
without a definitive Supreme Court ruling or at least a consensus
among the circuits, the boundaries were merely internal guidelines of
one executive administration, which could easily be altered by a
change in circumstances, a change in administration, or both.
III. REINTERPRETATION OF FISA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
A. The Patriot Act's Amendments to FISA
The terrorist attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001, were
the most horrific foreign strikes to ever occur on U.S. soil. The
following day the Department ofJustice began working "'on a package
of authorities ''1 53 to provide law enforcement with, in the words of
Attorney General John Ashcroft, "'all that is necessary... within the
bounds of the Constitution, to discharge the obligation to fight this
war against terror.' 154  A crisis mentality permeated the nation's
capital, which some administration officials saw as an opportunity to
push through previously rejected and long-stalled legal changes aimed
at strengthening law enforcement at the expense of civil liberties.
Attorney General Ashcroft challenged Congress to act quickly and
bypass the usual legislative process, enacting the new legislation within
a week.
55
With respect to FISA, the "Bush administration believed those
barriers [between law enforcement and foreign intelligence] were
getting in the way of uncovering terrorist cells operating here and
abroad.,156 As an illustration of this proposition, the Administration
cited the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "twentieth
153 Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002,
(Magazine), at 9 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh).
54 Id. (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft).
155 See id. at 20 ("'I think it is time for us to be productive on behalf of the
American people,' said the attorney general. 'Talk won't prevent terrorism,' Ashcroft
said, adding that he was 'deeply concerned about the rather slow pace' of the
legislation."); see also 147 CONG. REc. S10,991 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) ("We expedited the legislative process in the Judiciary Committee to
consider the Administration's proposals. In daily news conferences prior to the
original passage of the USA [Patriot] Act, the Attorney General referred to the need
for such prompt consideration.").
156 O'Harrow, supra note 153, at 11.
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hijacker," 57 whom the Administration claimed was under suspicion by
FBI law enforcement agents.15" The government claimed a FISA
warrant was never sought to search his computer because the primary
purpose test had made OIPR overly cautious about seeking FISA
surveillance against a suspect first identified by law enforcement.'
5
9
As a result of this perceived deficiency, one of the changes the
Justice Department proposed was to alter the FISA purpose
requirement from foreign intelligence must be "the purpose" of an
investigation, to simply "a purpose.,,160 However, congressional mem-
bers from both parties balked at the suggestion, fearing that "[g]iving
criminal investigators unchecked access to FISA powers could break
down constitutional safeguards against unreasonable searches and
seizures, leading to abuses against U.S. citizens."'' In the end, the two
sides compromised and section 218 of the Patriot Act amended the
language of FISA § 1804(a) (7) (B) to require that "a significant pur-
pose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion., 6
In accepting the compromise, however, Senator Leahy, the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and a cosponsor of the bill,
noted that "[n]o matter what statutory change is made even the
IJustice] Department concedes that the court may impose a
constitutional requirement of 'primary purpose' based on the
appellate court decisions upholding FISA against constitutional
challenges over the past 20 years.' 1 3 Regardless of any constitutional
157 Edward Lazarus, FindLaw Forum: Why the Case of Zacarias Moussaoui Presents a
Conundrum for Death Penalty Abolitionists (April 2, 2002), at http://us.cnn.com/2002/
LAW/04/columns/fl.lazarus.moussaoui.04.04/ (discussing the prosecution of Mous-
saoui as the "twentieth hijacker" of the September 11, 2001 attacks).
158 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 14, at 689-90 (stating that an FBI request to open a
criminal investigation of Moussaoui was denied because it might thwart a later FISA
request); see also Charles Lane, In Terror War, 2nd Track for Suspects; Those Designated
'Combatants' Lose Legal Protections, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at Al (reporting that
administration officials attributed the wall between law enforcement and counter-
intelligence for the failure to seek permission to search Moussaoui's computer pre-
September 11-a crucial missed opportunity which could have prevented the attacks).
159 DYCUS ET AL., supra note 14, at 689-90.
160 O'Harrow, supra note 153, at 18.
161 Id.
162 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (West Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). The
companion provision covering physical searches was also amended to "a significant
purpose." Id. § 1823(a) (7) (B); see also Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat.
291 (2001) (adding the "significant purpose" language).
163 147 CONG. Rrc. S11,003 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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doubts of Congress, the law passed overwhelmingly. Six weeks after
the attacks occurred, President Bush signed the bill into law.'6
4
B. The 2002 Attorney General Procedures
Shortly after passage of the Patriot Act, Attorney General Ashcroft
implemented it by replacing the 1995 Procedures ' with new
guidelines mandating closer interaction between law enforcement
and intelligence agents. The Attorney General adopted new
procedures for FISA investigations conducted "primarily for a law
enforcement purpose" but with a "significant foreign intelligence
purpose" as well. 166 The 2002 Procedures state that the "Criminal
Division and OIPR shall have access to all information developed in
full field [foreign intelligence] and [foreign counterintelligence]
investigations.'"67 Furthermore, the 2002 Procedures require the FBI,
Criminal Division, and OIPR to "consult with one another.., on all
issues necessary to the ability of the United States to investigate or
protect against foreign attack, sabotage, terrorism, and clandestine
intelligence activities, including protection against the foregoing
through criminal investigation and prosecution.""'s Most importantly,
the parties are required to consult on issues including "the initiation,
operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or
surveillance.'" 6"
The 2002 Procedures represented a dramatic shift from the prior
guidelines, which required the Criminal Division to avoid even the
appearance of directing or controlling a HSA investigation."7 Now, a FISA
164 For a discussion of the effect of the Patriot Act on investigative techniques, see
Rackow, supra note 14, at 1680-83.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 143-52 (discussing the 1995 Procedures in
greater detail).
166 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to the Assistant Attorney
General of the Criminal Division, Director of the FBI, Counsel for Intelligence Policy
and United States Attorneys § I (March 6, 2002) [hereinafter the 2002 Procedures]
(outlining "Intelligence Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign
Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the FBI"), http://www.fas.org/irp/
agenqc/doj/fisa/agO30602.html.
Id. § 11(A) (emphasis added).
168 Id. § II(B).
169 Id.
170 See The 1995 Procedures, supra note 143, A(6) ("[T]he FBI and Criminal
Division should ensure that advice intended to preserve the option of a criminal
prosecution does not inadvertently result in either the fact or the appearance of the
Criminal Division's directing or controlling the [foreign intelligence] or [foreign
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investigation, conducted primarily for law enforcement purposes but
with a significant foreign intelligence component, could be initiated,
directed and controlled by law enforcement officials, rather than
intelligence agents. However, both the 2002 Procedures and the
Patriot Act had yet to face judicial scrutiny.
C. The FISC Opinion
In May 2002, the government submitted the 2002 Procedures to
the FISC for en banc review. 7' The FISC previously had adopted the
1995 Procedures as proper minimization procedures and
"incorporated them in all applicable orders and warrants granted
since then.' 2  In this case, the government argued that the 2002
Procedures superseded the prior ones and therefore, requested that
the FISC incorporate the new guidelines into all future orders and
warrants.17 The FISC interpreted the issue before it as a straightfor-
ward analysis of whether the 2002 Procedures satisfied FISA's
minimization procedures requirement as stated in § 1801(h),'"4 rather
than as a constitutional question of whether FISA, as amended by the
Patriot Act, may be used for primarily law enforcement purposes.
17
5
The FISC began its analysis noting that investigative powers under
FISA are significantly broader than those granted to the government
under Title 111.176 Specifically, the FISC noted seven distinctions
between a FISA search and a standard criminal search as highlighted
in Table 1.1
77
counterintelligence] investigation toward law enforcement objectives."), at http://
www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html.
171 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218
F. Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002) [hereinafter FISC
Opinion]. The FISC Opinion was only the second one ever publicly disclosed.
172 Id. at 616.
173 Id.
174 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2000) (requiring the attorney general to adopt pro-
cedures to minimize dissemination of non-public available information concerning
unconsenting U.S. persons). The companion provision covering minimization
procedures for physical searches is id. § 1821 (4).
175 218 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
176 Id. at 616.
177 Id. at 617.
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Table 1: Comparison Between Powers Granted
Through FISA and Title III
Probable Cause Of being a foreign power or an Of criminal wrongdoing"
agent of a foreign power_78
Facilities Facility targeted must be used by Facility targeted must be used in
the foreign power or agent of a furtherance of criminal activity...
Covered foreign power; no need to show in
furtherance of activities"'.
Surveillance/searches conducted Must provide notice to target of
Notice without notice to target unless surveillance/search"'
prosecuted 8'
Duration Authorized for 90 days, may be up Authorized for no longer than 30
to a year '  days' s
May use surveillance for both May only be used as evidence of a
Usage foreign intelligence and as crime
evidence of crime"'.
May collect data by automatic Requires minimization during
Minimization recording and minimize after the surveillance"'
fact'
Not subject to discovery; ex parte, Must provide defendant with
At Trial in camera review by court'N application and order, and judge
may allow defendant to inspect
intercepts 9'
The FISC reasoned that FISA gives the government unusually
broad power to investigate and retain information for the purpose of
collecting foreign intelligence against U.S. persons. 92 By extending
those powers to law enforcement, the 2002 Procedures give the
Criminal Division "every legal advantage conceived by Congress to be
178 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (a) (3) (A).
179 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a) (2000).
"0 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (3) (B).
181 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (d).
"82 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(b).
183 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (D).
184 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (1).
185 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
"86 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b).
187 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4).
"'8 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (h) (1)-(2).
189 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
190 50 U.S.C. § 1806(0.
191 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(9)-(10).
192 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court No.
02-429, 218 F. Supp. 2d. 611, 617 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
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used by U.S. intelligence agencies to collect foreign intelligence
information.' 93 Therefore, the FISC concluded:
[t]he 2002 procedures appear to be designed to amend the law and
substitute the FISA for Title III electronic surveillances and Rule 41
searches. This may be because the government is unable to meet the
substantive requirements of these law enforcement tools, or because
their administrative burdens are too onerous. In either case, the FISA's
definition of minimization procedures has not changed, and [the 2002]
procedures cannot be used by the government to amend the Act in ways
Congress has not.194
The issue before the FISC, therefore, was whether the 2002
Procedures exceeded the bounds of FISA.
The FISC noted that pursuant to § 1801(h), minimization
procedures must be "consistent with the need of the United States to
'obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information."'' 9
Thus, the FISC concluded that "[i]f direction of counterintelligence
cases involving the use of highly intrusive FISA surveillances and
searches by criminal prosecutors is necessary to obtain and produce
foreign intelligence information, it is yet to be explained to the
court."'' 96
To ensure the 2002 Procedures fell within their statutory purpose,
the FISC held that the FBI, the Criminal Division, and OIPR may
consult and coordinate with each other, but "law enforcement officials
shall not make recommendations to intelligence officials concerning
the initiation, operation, continuation or expansion of FISA searches
or surveillances. '" 97 Furthermore, the FISC held that the parties must
ensure that "law enforcement officials do not direct or control the use
of the FISA procedures to enhance criminal prosecution, and that
advice.., does not inadvertently result in the Criminal Division's
directing or controlling the investigation using FISA searches and
surveillances toward law enforcement objectives."' 9
Thus, the FISC unanimously modified the 2002 Procedures by
eliminating those FISA investigations directed for primarily law
enforcement purposes without even acknowledging the Patriot Act's
effect on FISA or deciding the constitutional issue of a significant
193 Id. at 624.
194 Id. at 623.
:15 Id. (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h) (1)) (emphasis added).
196 218 F. Supp. 2d at 624.




purpose. The ruling was a remarkable blow to the government by a
court, which up until this point, had done little more than rubber
stamp government foreign intelligence activities. While civil libertari-
ans applauded the decision, their celebration would be short lived.
D. The Government's Appeal
Rather than appeal the FISC Opinion, the government brought
an application for surveillance against a U.S. person under the 2002
Procedures framework. 99 The FISC authorized the surveillance, but
imposed the same limitations on the investigation as it laid out in its
FISC Opinion to ensure law enforcement officials did not direct or
control FISA investigations for criminal prosecution purposes.20 0 The
government, for the first time in the twenty-four year history of FISA,
appealed to the FISCR.
In its brief, the government made three principal arguments for
why FISA surveillances may be used for primarily law enforcement
purposes. First, the Justice Department argued that the courts had
misapplied the pre-Patriot Act FISA over the past twenty years by
reading into the statutory language the need for foreign intelligence
201to be the primary purpose of an investigation. Second, even if the
primary purpose test was correct, the Patriot Act amended that
language to "a significant purpose," which allows for a primary
2012purpose that is not foreign intelligence. Third, the primary purpose
test is not constitutionally required, and therefore the Patriot Act's
amended language is valid.20 ' Therefore, the government argued that
the FISC erred when it rejected the "direction or control" provisions
204of the 2002 Procedures.
199 Brief for the United States, In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance






204 Id. In response to the FISC's statutory argument, the government argued the
FISC had misapplied the minimization requirements of the Act. The government
claimed the minimization requirements only deal with information "not otherwise
subject to collection under FISA," while the 2002 Procedures governed only
coordination among agencies regarding foreign intelligence information already
sanctioned by FISA. Id.
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The government's brief noted that the original intent of FISA was
to gather foreign intelligence information, which may include
evidence of criminal activity.2 5 First, the government argued that
foreign intelligence investigations conducted primarily for law
206enforcement purposes are within the scope of FISA.. The statute
does not "limit how the government may use the information" it
collects and "[p]rosecution is often a most effective means of
protecting national security."20 7 Thus, in the opinion of the Justice
Department, for the past twenty years the courts had misinterpreted
FISA by distinguishing between law enforcement and foreign
intelligence rather than between actions taken to protect national
security and those that did not.20s The government argued the
"primary purpose" cases were decided wrongly because "the
government never advanced the idea that prosecution may be used to
protect national security, or that FISA may be used to obtain evidence
.,209
for such a prosecution.
Second, even if the purpose distinction and the primary purpose
test were considered the correct reading of the original FISA
language, the Patriot Act amended the requirement to "a significant
purpose.2 10  Thus, the government argued, so long as foreign
intelligence remained a significant purpose, the primary purpose
could be criminal prosecution.21 Furthermore, because the term
"significant" is neither a relative nor a comparative term, the
government argued that the courts do not need to investigate or
review the role of law enforcement in the investigation. 21 2 "Indeed,
where law enforcement officials seek evidence to prosecute a spy or
terrorist, intelligence officials will always (or almost always) have at
least a significant purpose to obtain the same information. As a
result, the government concluded the "direction or control"
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt.1, at 49 (1978) ("Obviously, use of
'foreign intelligence information' as evidence in a criminal trial is one way the
Government can lawfully protect against clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage,
and international terrorism.").
208 See Government's Brief, supra note 199 at II.A.5 (arguing that law enforcement
operations should not be considered per se improper under FISA).
29 Id.
210 Id. at II.B.1.
211 Id. at II.B.2.




restriction imposed by the FISC Opinion has no support in the text of
the law or in any interpretation of it.
2' 4
Finally, the government claimed the primary purpose test is more
demanding than that which the Fourth Amendment requires, and
215thus the Patriot Act's significant purpose test is constitutional. The
Department of Justice argued that while Keith held that intelligence-
gathering investigations involving domestic organizations implicate
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements, more flexible standards
could apply to intelligence investigations involving foreign powers.2 1 6
Because FISA necessarily involves foreign threats, the government
reaffirmed the argument that it relies on the president's inherent
powers as commander in chief and as the sole organ in foreign
217affairs. Foreign affairs is a sphere where the president "exercises
very delicate, plenary and exclusive power, and in which judicial
intervention is rarely proper."21 8
The brief claimed that "the nature of the threat, not the nature of
the government's response to the threat ... determines the constitu-
tionality of national security surveillance. 2 1 9 The government con-
cluded so long as the investigation is directed towards a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power, the full Fourth Amendment strictures
do not apply, regardless of whether law enforcement is its primary
220
purpose. "Nothing in Keith suggests that the availability of more
relaxed constitutional standards for a search or surveillance depends
,,121on the absence of a law enforcement purpose. While not adopting
the government's reasoning, the FISCR upheld the government's
position.
E. The FISCR Reversal
In its first-ever ruling, the FISCR reversed the FISC decision,
222
claiming it lacked both statutory and constitutional foundation.





218 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
219 Id. (emphasis omitted).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719-20 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillence Ct.
Rev. 2002) (per curiam), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1615 (2003).
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many of the statutory definitions in FISA, including "agent of a
foreign power" or "international terrorism," may include elements of
criminal activity, which the FISCR broadly defined as "foreign
intelligence crimes."223 The court held "it is virtually impossible to
read the 1978 FISA to exclude from its purpose the prosecution of
foreign intelligence crimes, most importantly because . . . the
definition of an agent of a foreign power-if he or she is a U.S.
person-is grounded on criminal conduct."2 4  Thus, the FISCR
concluded that FISA never contemplated that a court ever would
inquire into the government's purpose at all or require a non-law
enforcement foCUS.
225
The FISCR noted that the legislative history supported the
government's argument that Congress specifically intended for the
use of law enforcement to protect against foreign intelligence
226threats.. Since the term "foreign intelligence information" includes
foreign intelligence crimes, the purpose requirement in FISA was to
prevent the use of FISA warrants for gathering non-foreign intelligence
information and not to restrict the government's use of proper foreign
intelligence information to criminally prosecute.227 The court agreed
with the government that "prosecution is one way to combat foreign
intelligence crimes."22 s
Finally, the court held that the primary purpose cases, like Duggan
and Johnson, never tied the primary purpose test to the language in
the statute. 229 The FISCR observed Duggan "never explained why it
apparently read foreign intelligence information to exclude evidence
of crimes-endorsing the district court's implied dichotomy-when
the statute's definitions of foreign intelligence and foreign agent are
actually cast in terms of criminal conduct., 3 ° The Court recognized that
the government's principal objective is to stop the agent's activities by
223 Id. at 723. The § 1801(b) (2) (A) definition of an "agent of a foreign power"
includes a person who "knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities... [which] may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United
States." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A). § 1801(c)(1) defines international terrorism as
activities that "involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States." § 1801 (c)(1).
224 310 F.3d at 723.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 724-25.
227 Id. at 725.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 726 (emphasis omitted).
230 Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
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"any means, but if one considers the actual ways in which the
government would foil espionage or terrorism it becomes apparent
that criminal prosecution analytically cannot be placed easily in a
separate response category.,231
While the original FISA language did not contemplate a
distinction between law enforcement and foreign intelligence
purposes, the Patriot Act's significant purpose test certainly does.32
Therefore, the FISCR held that the government's argument based on
the pre-Patriot FISA language was no longer valid, since the
dichotomy between law enforcement and foreign intelligence was now
relevant, although under the less stringent significant purpose test.
2 3 3
In applying the Patriot Act, the FISCR held that while law
enforcement objectives may be the primary purpose, the objectives
must be directed towards foreign intelligence crime, rather than
234ordinary crime. The Court rejected the government's argument
that "prosecutions of non-foreign intelligence crimes are consistent
with a purpose of gaining foreign intelligence information so long as
the government's objective is to stop espionage or terrorism by
putting an agent of a foreign power in prison. 2 3' 5 The FISCR reasoned
that such a use would transgress the meaning and purpose of FISA,
which intended the certification requirement "to prevent the
government from targeting a foreign agent when its true purpose was
to gain non-foreign intelligence information-such as evidence of
ordinary crimes or scandals."
23 6
Thus, even if the government had a significant foreign
intelligence purpose, a FISA application should be denied if its
primary purpose was criminal prosecution for non-foreign intelli-
gence crimes. 23' The court also recognized, however, that "ordinary
crimes might be inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence
crimes"-such as international terrorists who finance their terrorist
231 Id.
232 Id. at 735.
233 Id. The FISCR noted that Congress, while adopting the law enforce-
ment/foreign intelligence dichotomy in the Patriot Act's significant purpose test, did
not amend the term "foreign intelligence information" which the FISCR already stated
includes foreign intelligence crimes. Id. However, the FISCR opinion reasoned
around this "analytic conundrum" by reading the pre-Patriot FISA language as
excluding FISA investigations with the "sole objective of criminal prosecution." Id.
234 Id. at 736.
235 Id. at 735-36 (emphasis omitted).
236 Id. at 736 (internal quotations omitted).
237 Id.
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activities by robbing banks-that would then make FISA applicable.
Under such a scenario, the FISCR held FISA could be used to
investigate the bank robbery "as evidence of the terrorist act itself" but
not to "investigate wholly unrelated ordinary crimes.,
239
Turning to the constitutionality of the Patriot Act, the FISCR did
not decide whether a FISA warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirements, but rather, limited its analysis to whether FISA
searches under the significant purpose test are constitutionally
reasonable .
To answer this question, the FISCR analyzed Truong and identified
what it considered to be the false premise upon which that opinion
was based-specifically, that once an investigation became criminal in
nature, "its foreign policy concerns recede."24' The court noted that
in the field of counterintelligence, intelligence and law enforcement
purposes are intertwined.242  Thus, the line Truong drew between
foreign intelligence and law enforcement was "inherently unstable,
unrealistic and confusing." 243 Furthermore, such line drawing led to
"dangerous confusion" and "perverse organizational incentives" as
walls were constructed between intelligence and law enforcement
divisions, discouraging cooperation necessary to ensure national
security.244 While national security concerns cannot abrogate Fourth
Amendment requirements, the court held that Truong misinterpreted
both the government's interest and the Supreme Court's ruling in
Keith, which suggested that a more relaxed warrant procedure may be
appropriate in cases involving national security than in cases involving
245ordinary crime. Thus, the FISCR concluded the distinction that the
Supreme Court had suggested in Keith was the same as stated by the
original FISA language-a distinction between ordinary crimes and
foreign intelligence crimes. 46 In the case of foreign intelligence
crimes, the government's overwhelming interest is to prevent the
immediate threat through whatever means available, including
238 Id.
2'39 Id.
240 Id. at 742.








criminal prosecution. 247  The court concluded "[p]unishment of the
terrorist or espionage agent is really a secondary objective; indeed,
punishment of a terrorist is often a moot point.
24
1
Finally, the court held FISA is constitutional under the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment "special needs" doctrine, which upholds
"warrantless and even suspicionless searches that are designed to serve
the government's 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.' ' ,249 The FISCR noted that the Supreme Court rejected
suspicionless searches when the primary purpose was ordinary law
enforcement.250  The "special needs" cases, however, permit the
government to pursue a special programmatic purpose, such as public
school discipline, road safety, or immigration control, without regard
to the subjective intent of the officers . Thus, the Fourth
Amendment analysis does not consider whether an officer's subjective
purpose is law enforcement provided there is a non-law enforcement
special need.
Applying this "special needs" analysis, the FISCR concluded that
"FISA's general programmatic purpose, to protect the nation against
terrorists and espionage threats directed by foreign powers... [is]
distinguishable from ordinary crime control.' 2  Because protection
against foreign threats of terrorism is its main purpose, FISA falls
253
within the Fourth Amendment's "special needs" doctrine. As a
result, the FISCR found searches and surveillance conducted without
the normal Fourth Amendment protections of a warrant and judicial
authorization and review to be constitutionally reasonable.2 4
247 Id.
248 Id. at 744-45.
249 Id. at 745 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)); see
also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (upholding suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding
roadblocks to stop drunk drivers constitutional); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (permitting suspicionless border patrol checkpoint stops as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
250 310 F.3d at 745 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 4142
(2000)); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-84 (2001) (rejecting
drug testing of obstetrics patients where "the immediate objective of the searches was
to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes").
251 310 F.3d at 745; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
(holding the subjective intent of a police officer is irrelevant in a probable cause
analysis).
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IV. EXAMINING THE FISCR OPINION
A. Statutory Analysis: The Flawed Distinction of Foreign Intelligence Crimes
The FISCR first stated that the pre-Patriot Act FISA language
clearly contemplated the criminal prosecution of foreign intelligence
crimes, which it tried to distinguish from ordinary crimes2 55 The
FISCR's definition of "foreign intelligence crimes" was based on the
statutory definitions of "agent of a foreign power," "international
terrorism," and "sabotage.256 This distinction, however, is anything
but apparent in these statutory definitions.
The statutory language does not clearly delineate between foreign
intelligence crimes and other criminal violations. Specifically,
§ 1801 (b) (2) (A) of Tide III states that an "agent of a foreign power"
includes any person who "knowingly engages in clandestine intelli-
gence gathering activities[,] ... which activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States.' 25'7  The
statutory definition leaves open the possibility that a U.S. citizen may
be involved in clandestine intelligence activities that do not involve
criminal conduct at all. Furthermore, while the statute clearly
contemplates crimes like espionage, any violation of the criminal
statutes, no matter how minor, would fall within its definition.
Similarly, the term "international terrorism" is defined as "violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States... or that would be a criminal
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States" 258 and
"occur totally outside the United States or transcend national boundaries.
259
Like the definition of an "agent of a foreign power," this definition
does not apply only to crimes committed in the United States.
Finally, the term "foreign intelligence information" does not have
any criminal conduct component to it at all. It is broadly defined as
information necessary for the United States to protect against "actual
or potential attack.., or international terrorism. Criminal
conduct is not required.
255 Id. at 722-23.
256 Id. at 723.
257 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b) (2) (A) (2000) (emphasis added).
2 § 1801 (c) (1) (emphasis added).
259 § 1801(c) (3) (emphasis added)
260 § 1801(e) (1) (A)-(B).
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The FISCR simply mischaracterized the statute when it stated that
a FISA investigation is necessarily "grounded on criminal conduct.
2'
Even if criminal conduct is involved, FISA does not distinguish
between types of substantive crimes, but rather allows for any criminal
violation to qualify as an agent of a foreign power and any violent or
life threatening crime for purposes of defining international
terrorism. It is hard to see any statutory basis for the Court's foreign
intelligence crime/ordinary crime distinction.
The FISCR wrote "it is virtually impossible to read the 1978 FISA
to exclude from its purpose the prosecution of foreign intelligence
crimes."262 But the court's interpretation is at odds with § 1806(b),
which expressly states that no FISA information "shall be disclosed for
263law enforcement purposes" without prior approval. Further, the
statute requires that FISA information "may only be used in a criminal
proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney
General." 64 Clearly, the plain language and structure of the statute
set up the dichotomy between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement. If, as the FISCR claimed, the criminal prosecution of
foreign intelligence crimes was contemplated by FISA, why would the
heightened disclosure requirement of § 1806(b) be warranted? Why
would the disclosure requirement explicitly distinguish between
foreign intelligence crimes and ordinary crimes, requiring nothing for
the former, but heightened approval for the latter?
The legislative history further reveals the deficiency in the FISCR
reasoning. While Congress clearly anticipated the use of FISA
information in subsequent criminal trials, FISA surveillances "are not
primarily for the purpose of gathering evidence of a crime. They are
to obtain foreign intelligence information, which when it concerns
United States persons must be necessary to important national
concerns." 265 It was Congress that created the foreign intelligence/law
enforcement dichotomy by writing it into the statute itself.
B. Statutory Analysis: The Effect of the Patriot Act
The FISCR held that the Patriot Act, by adding the relational term
("significant purpose"), eliminates the justification for the FISC to
261 310 F.3d at 723.
262 Id.
263 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b).
264 Id.
265 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at36 (1978).
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balance the relative weight of criminal prosecution and foreign
intelligence purposes in determining the admissibility of FISA-S 266
obtained evidence. The court, however, rejected the government's
argument that the Patriot Act authorizes FISA investigations for any
case where foreign intelligence information is a significant purpose.267
The FISCR reasoned that the intention of the § 1804(a) (7) (B) signifi-
cant purpose requirement " is to prevent the government from
269
targeting a foreign agent for non-foreign intelligence reasons.
Therefore, the court limited the scope of the Patriot Act amendment
to foreign intelligence information, which may include the prosecu-
tion of foreign intelligence crimes. But this distinction fails as well.
The FISCR's interpretation of the Patriot Act creates an odd
distinction between law enforcement investigations primarily for
foreign intelligence crimes and investigations of ordinary crimes. As
stated above, the term "foreign intelligence crimes" does not
encompass a precisely defined subset of crimes, but may include
270violation of any criminal statute of the United States T. Under the
FISCR analysis, the real distinction depends on who is committing the
crime. According to the FISCR opinion then, if U.S. citizens, who are
agents of a foreign power, commit any crime (even one such as
perjury) it would qualify as a foreign intelligence crime. Limiting the
Patriot Act to foreign intelligence crimes is essentially no limitation at
all. The ruling becomes even more problematic when one considers
that the term "agent of a foreign power" encompasses any U.S. person
who knowingly aids and abets a foreign power. 27 These definitions
are broad enough to include anyone who actively supports groups like
the Irish Republican Army, the Palestine Liberation Organization,
and other political groups.
The FISCR foreign intelligence crime distinction is further
weakened by the court's "inextricably intertwined" exception: A FISA
law enforcement investigation is appropriate when ordinary crimes
are "inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes. 2 72 The
266 310 F.3d at 735.
267 Id. at 735-36; see also supra text accompanying notes 232-39 (analyzing the
court's narrower interpretation of "significant purpose").
268 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (7) (B) requires the government to certify in the application
for a FISA warrant that a significant purpose of the surveillance is foreign intelligence.
269 310 F.3d at 725.
270 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the problematic definition of "foreign intelli-
gence crimes").
271 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b)(1).
272 310 F.3d at 736.
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court used, as an example of this phenomenon, international
terrorists who engage in bank robberies to finance their terrorist
activities.273  Under the FISCR intertwinement rationale, the
government can obtain a warrant through FISA, rather than Title III,
to investigate both the robberies and the terrorism.2 74  Without
describing the standard by which "inextricably intertwined" should be
measured, the court concluded that FISA "cannot be used as a device
to investigate wholly unrelated ordinary crimes." 75 The court's
position, however, sets up a slippery slope as to how unconnected the
ordinary criminal conduct must be before it is wholly unrelated to the
foreign intelligence crime. Furthermore, because the exact details of
terrorist plans are often unknown, it would be virtually impossible to
determine the level of relatedness between the crime and the foreign
intelligence purpose at the time of obtaining surveillance
authorization.
C. Constitutional Analysis: The Role of Primary
Purpose in Criminal Prosecutions
In discussing the constitutionality of the Patriot Act, the court did
not decide whether a FISA warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. As stated by the FISC, there are a number of
requirements that Title III, the codification of Fourth Amendment
protections, imposes, but FISA does not-most importantly, probable
cause of criminal activity.176 Rather than argue that FISA satisfied the
Fourth Amendment, the court turned to the determination of
whether the primary purpose test was constitutionally required to
qualify as an exception to the Fourth Amendment.
2 77
The issue is whether, in adding to the president's power to
conduct foreign intelligence investigations, FISA remains
constitutionally reasonable.2 ' The Truong court held the primary
purpose test was the "constitutional minimum" required when
applying the foreign intelligence exception without a warrant.279 The
FISCR argued that since FISA adds procedures resembling warrant





276 See supra text accompanying note 177 (comparing Title III to FISA).
277 310 F.3d at 742.
278 Id. at 746.
279 629 F.2d at 914 n.4.
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the issue instead is whether the less stringent significant purpose
requirement is constitutionally reasonable. °  It seems the court's
argument is that because FISA imposes a procedural framework on
the government seeking to conduct surveillance, the constitutional
floor can be lowered from the standard applied in warrantless
surveillance. The FISCR misinterpreted the issue. Courts have
recognized a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement inherent in the president's const-
211itutional power. It was the excessive abuse of this power by the
Executive Branch, however, that prompted Congress to pass FISA.
Congress was not expanding presidential power, but regulating its
usage within the preexisting foreign intelligence exception. The
FISCR plainly erred in holding that a validly enacted congressional
statute may not encroach upon the president's "inherent"
constitutional power.
Presidential foreign affairs power is not an enumerated power in
the Constitution, but rather stems from the Vesting Clause, which
vests the executive power of the United States in the president. 212 In
the famous Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson wrote that "presidential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction
or conjunction with those of Congress."23 In his three-part analysis,
Justice Jackson stated that "[w]hen the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb."2 4  In 1978, following the devastating
revelations of the Church Committee, Congress deliberately acted to
limit presidential power over foreign intelligence investigations.
Congress was not adding to presidential foreign intelligence power, as
FISCR claims, but rather carefully regulating the use of that power.
The fact that FISA establishes procedural requirements that are not
equivalent to traditional Fourth Amendment protections does not
thereby justify broader use of the foreign intelligence exception in
gathering evidence of a crime than the Constitution allows. FISA
overlies the constitutional scope of the foreign intelligence exception,
and a search under the former cannot be more extensive than a
280 310 F.3d at 746.
See supra Part I.C (examining how circuit courts of appeal have defined the
foreign intelligence exception).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
283 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,J,
concurring).
284 Id. at 637.
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search allowable under the latter. Therefore, both Duggan and
Johnson were correct in applying the primary purpose test to the
application of FISA searches.
The FISCR conflates the government's interest in foreign
intelligence with its interest in subsequent criminal prosecution based
on the fruits of that surveillance. In applying a balancing test between
an individual's privacy interests and the government's interest, the
Truong court held that during a foreign intelligence search, "the
government has the greatest need for speed, stealth, and secrecy, and
the surveillance in such cases is most likely to call into play difficult
and subtle judgments about foreign and military affairs." 2 6 But once
the investigation is conducted primarily for criminal purposes, "courts
are entirely competent to make the usual probable cause
determination."2 7 The Truong reasoning does not falter even in cases
of criminal prosecution of so-called foreign intelligence crimes.
Once the investigation becomes criminal in nature, the
government should not be able to bootstrap onto the prior foreign
intelligence investigation to bypass the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. The FISCR's distinction between ordinary crimes and
foreign intelligence crimes is contrary to Justice Douglas' view in Katz
that "spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers. 2 8  Applying the FISCR
opinion in such cases would lead to bifurcated Fourth Amendment
protection depending upon the nature of the crime. Moreover, since
foreign intelligence crimes are not clearly defined, following the
FISCR opinion would mean Fourth Amendment protections for U.S.
citizens will vary depending upon their relationships with foreign
powers-a completely anomalous result.
Most importantly, the courts have found that the constitutional
basis for the foreign intelligence exception is in the president's power
as commander in chief and as the sole organ in foreign affairs. As the
Fifth Circuit stated in Brown, "[r]estrictions upon the President's
power which are appropriate in cases of domestic security become
artificial in the context of the international sphere."2 9 The presi-
dent's foreign affairs powers are implicated in foreign intelligence
285 See supra text accompanying notes 131-42 (explaining the Duggan and Johnson
rulin s).
629 F.2d at 915.
287 Id.
288 389 U.S. at 360 (Douglas,J., concurring).
289 484 F.2d at 426.
20031
426 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
investigations because the government may decide to respond to a
terrorist or foreign power threat through non-law enforcement
means, including military action, covert operation, counterintelli-
gence operation, or diplomatic measures. But once the government
instead decides to follow a law enforcement strategy, those powers are
not implicated, and there is no constitutional basis for a FISA law
enforcement investigation.
Even if the FISCR argument is correct that foreign policy concerns
do not necessarily recede once the investigation becomes primarily for
law enforcement purposes, that proposition does not lead to the
conclusion that law enforcement may now "direct or control" a FISA
investigation to meet its objectives. Rather, if foreign policy concerns
remain, a FISA investigation with a primary purpose of foreign
intelligence should continue, and coordination with law enforcement
should be encouraged; however, this cooperation should not extend
such that FISA may be used as an end run around the Fourth
Amendment. Once the foreign intelligence purpose diminishes in
relation to the law enforcement purpose, the normal strictures of the
Fourth Amendment should apply.
The Supreme Court's holding in Keith reaffirms this position by
stating that the Fourth Amendment does apply to national security
cases involving domestic organizations. Where criminal activity is
involved, no matter how sensitive or serious the threat, the Supreme
Court held that judges are capable of meeting their obligations
without "fractur[ing] the secrecy essential to official intelligence
gathering., 290 Thus, in light of Keith, the FISCR creates a situation
where criminal investigations into national security threats involving
domestic organizations-such as the Oklahoma City bombing-would
require full Fourth Amendment warrant protections, while a similar
criminal investigation involving U.S. citizens deemed "foreign agents"
would not. But if the judiciary is capable of handling one
circumstance, why not the other?
Congress has reaffirmed the applicability of the normal Fourth
Amendment protections to sensitive national security investigations by
expanding the list of predicate offenses to which Title III applies. In
addition to the list of ordinary state and federal felony offenses
covered by Tide 111,291 Congress added a set of new crimes including:
290 407 U.S. at 320.
291 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c) (2000) (listing the ordinary offenses encompassed
by Title III such as bribery, mail fraud, and obstruction of law enforcement).
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espionage, sabotage, treason, terrorism, hostage taking, destruction of
aircraft, sabotage of nuclear facilities, presidential assassination, and
using biological materials. z If the normal judicial process is capable
of handling law enforcement investigations of these sensitive national
security crimes involving domestic organizations, the government
should trust that the process is equally capable when a similar law
enforcement investigation instead targets U.S. citizens who are agents
of a foreign power.
Instead of looking at the clear congressional intent of FISA and
the modifications to Title III, the FISCR opinion clings to the dicta in
Keith that states that "[d] ifferent standards may be compatible with the
Fourth Amendment .... For the warrant application may vary
according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature
of citizen rights deserving protection. This statement, however,
was taken out of context. In Keith, the Supreme Court was addressing
the issue of standards for "surveillances . . .directed primarily to the
collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to subversive
forces, and [was] not [addressing] an attempt to gather evidence for specific
criminal prosecutions.''294 The language upon which the government
and the FISCR base their arguments is misapplied.
In sum, the result of these mischaracterizations is that the FISCR
clearly erred in holding that the primary purpose test, the
constitutional minimum that defines the foreign intelligence
exception, could be expanded by the Patriot Act. Furthermore, the
FISCR erred in finding the president had inherent constitutional
authority to conduct surveillance outside the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment where the purpose of the investigation was law
enforcement. Finally, both Keith and the amended predicate offenses
to Title III demonstrate that courts are more than capable of handling
law enforcement investigations in sensitive national security matters.
D. Constitutional Analysis: The Special Needs Doctrine
The FISCR's last argument, relying on the Supreme Court's
special needs doctrine, is equally unpersuasive. Specifically, the court
held that since FISA's general programmatic purpose is "to protect
the nation against terrorists and espionage threats directed by foreign
powers," which is distinguishable from ordinary crime control, it falls
292 § 2516(1) (a)-(c).
293 407 U.S. at 322-23.
294 Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added).
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within the special needs doctrine.29 r But the case law does not support
this holding.
The Supreme Court previously rejected the very same arguments
that the FISCR upholds in its opinion. First, although the Supreme
Court upheld under its special needs doctrine a roadblock, a locker
search, and a drug test, the level of intrusiveness of a FISA search is
exceptionally greater than these searches. 96  Second, under the
Patriot Act, the foreign intelligence purpose need only be significant,
and therefore, law enforcement could be the primary purpose.
The Supreme Court held in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 2 v that a
roadblock program, whose "primary purpose ... is to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing... contravenes the Fourth
Amendment."298  The Court warned that "the gravity of the threat
alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law
enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. "299
Fourth Amendment protections should still apply even in the face of
serious threats. Further, the fact that foreign intelligence might be a
lawful secondary purpose does not suffice to make the FISA search
permissible. The Supreme Court stated that if it allowed checkpoints
based on "lawful secondary purposes," checkpoints would be
established "for virtually any purpose so long as they also included a
license or sobriety check."30 0 Therefore, the FISCR opinion is nothing
more than rehashed special needs arguments already heard and
rejected in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Finally, the FISCR argued that the government's subjective
purpose should not be taken into account, because intent is irrelevant
to Fourth Amendment analysis.3 0 ' The Supreme Court, however,
distinguished between the subjective intent of officers stopping a car
and the programmatic purposes of a roadblock scheme. The Patriot
Act and the 2002 Procedures, by requiring only a significant foreign
intelligence purpose, not only leave open the possibility of law
enforcement as a primary purpose, but actively envision surveillance
and searches initiated for primarily law enforcement reasons.
295 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillence Ct. Rev.
2002) (per curiam), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1615 (2003).
29 See supra note 249 (providing examples of the special needs doctrine).
297 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
298 Id. at 42.
299 Id. at 42.
300 Id. at 46.
301 310 F.3d at 745.
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Surveillance for ordinary law enforcement purposes, without the
procedural protections of a warrant, probable cause, and prior
judicial approval, contravenes the Fourth Amendment.
The FISCR relied on one sentence in the Edmond opinion, which
states that "circumstances... may justify a law enforcement
checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some
emergency, relate to ordinary crime control."3 02 The Supreme Court
used the example that "the Fourth Amendment would almost
certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart
an imminent terrorist attack., 30 3  The FISCR misinterpreted the
Edmond example. The High Court was using the term "emergency," to
imply imminence, not a description of the nature of the attack. It is
not the general threat of a terrorist attack that permits the roadblock
in the Edmond example, but the exigencies caused by the imminence of
that attack. The Edmond example provides no support for a statutory
framework permitting highly intrusive searches for the primary
purpose of law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
On November 18, 2002, the FISCR granted the government a new
and incredibly powerful tool in the war on terror at the expense of the
Fourth Amendment. By upholding the Patriot Act and the 2002
Procedures, the FISCR permitted, for the first time, the use of the
foreign intelligence exception to bypass the constitutional rights of
U.S. citizens targeted in law enforcement investigations. The FISCR
opinion is unpersuasive in arguing that the significant purpose test
and the "direct or control" language of the 2002 Procedures pass
statutory and constitutional muster.
First, the Court's argument fails on statutory grounds. The FISCR
opinion rests on the unworkable interpretation of a "foreign
intelligence crime," which is based neither in the statute, nor in the
case law, nor in logic. Though the Court attempts to limit the Patriot
Act's application to these newly created "foreign intelligence crimes,"
the limitation seems to include a violation of any criminal statute of
the United States or any ordinary crime that is "inextricably
intertwined" with foreign intelligence crimes.
Second, the FISCR opinion cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
302 531 U.S. at 44.
03 Id.
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The Court argues that the foreign intelligence exception is the
constitutional minimum upon which FISA expands; however, this
argument misunderstands the very nature of presidential power as
defined in landmark cases like Steel Seizure. FISA overlies the foreign
intelligence exception of the Fourth Amendment, and a search under
the former cannot be more extensive than a search allowable under
the latter. Lastly, the Patriot Act cannot find justification under the
special needs doctrine because it permits investigations whose
purpose is primarily ordinary law enforcement.
Administration supporters argue that the FISC provides
appropriate Fourth Amendment oversight of a neutral and detached
magistrate. It is clear, however, that from the limited discretion
provided to FISC judges and the minimal scrutiny by which Congress
intended them to review applications, the FISC does not meet
constitutional standards. According to the attorney general's annual
reports, from 1979 to 2001, "the FISC approved without modification
14,031 out of 14,036 applications, or 99.96% of the total." °4 With
minimal scrutiny applied at the FISC level and errant decisions at the
FISCR, U.S. citizens are left with very little protection against the ever-
increasing national security power of the government and a return of
the pre-Church Committee days. Our liberty is too high a price to pay
for this kind of security.
34 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 30,
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (2002) (Nos. 02-001, 02-002) (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002) available, at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
2cddO2b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/terrorism I/$FILE/FISCRAmicus.pdf.
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